exerpt;
Based upon analysis of this communication, as well as other more recent communications, the Northeast Intelligence Network most certainly may be in possession of further information, as have you and every other entity which read Mr. Taylor’s report. This kind of information is known within the United States Intelligence Community (US IC) as Indications & Warnings (I&W). Moreover, the list in the communication we collected goes far beyond strikes in the manner of the London or Madrid suicide bombers on the transporation sector in the northeastern United States and Canada. This communication discussed strikes against nine different nuclear power stations located across the entire northeast region and the entire electrical grid. In multiple and overwhelming instances it references strikes against the financial infrastructure of the United States based in New York City. It discusses what can only be mass tactical assaults on seven passenger laden commercial airports. It discussed the financial impact upon the United States during a time of financial crisis as well as the minimal cost to the Islamic jihadists in executing the strikes, and that they will occur at some particular point in time without warning.
Let’s shift our focus to Mumbai. How do these multiple attacks in India compare to what I’ve just discussed? They are well-coordinated mass attacks across a single major Indian city. But more importantly I think it should be obvious that the tactical execution of these attacks evidences a significant departure from the previous template of broad-daylight terrorist strikes. These Indian jihadists utilized darkness as tactical cover for the execution of a major, multi-faceted terrorist operation by launching the entire operation at 10 PM local time in Mumbai.
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Based upon analysis of this communication, as well as other more recent communications, the Northeast Intelligence Network most certainly may be in possession of further information, as have you and every other entity which read Mr. Taylor’s report. This kind of information is known within the United States Intelligence Community (US IC) as Indications & Warnings (I&W). Moreover, the list in the communication we collected goes far beyond strikes in the manner of the London or Madrid suicide bombers on the transporation sector in the northeastern United States and Canada. This communication discussed strikes against nine different nuclear power stations located across the entire northeast region and the entire electrical grid. In multiple and overwhelming instances it references strikes against the financial infrastructure of the United States based in New York City. It discusses what can only be mass tactical assaults on seven passenger laden commercial airports. It discussed the financial impact upon the United States during a time of financial crisis as well as the minimal cost to the Islamic jihadists in executing the strikes, and that they will occur at some particular point in time without warning.
Let’s shift our focus to Mumbai. How do these multiple attacks in India compare to what I’ve just discussed? They are well-coordinated mass attacks across a single major Indian city. But more importantly I think it should be obvious that the tactical execution of these attacks evidences a significant departure from the previous template of broad-daylight terrorist strikes. These Indian jihadists utilized darkness as tactical cover for the execution of a major, multi-faceted terrorist operation by launching the entire operation at 10 PM local time in Mumbai.
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The world media cannot bring themselves to report the truth.
It is ISLAMIC terrorism.
'According to a report by Reuters, the terrorists have expressed their desire to negotiate with the Indian government for the release of the hostages.
The government, however, has repeatedly stated that it will not negotiate. '
Jerusalem Post
India will not negotiate with the ISLAMIC terrorists.
The U.S. will not negotiate with Al Queda
Only Israel is expected to negotiate with them.
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